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DEFENSES TO WAR CRIMES:
A CONCEPTUAL OVERVIEW Anthony D'Amato * ABSTRACT. As international criminal law continues to grow in importance, defenses to charges of war crimes are taking on a generic standardization that covers prosecutions in national courts as well as in international tribunals. This paper briefly discusses the most important defenses and their theoretical interconnections. Substantive defenses include superior orders, command responsibility, tu quoque, military necessity, proportionality, and reprisals. Jurisdictional defenses applicable in national tribunals include personal jurisdiction, subject-matter jurisdiction, and double jeopardy.
As international criminal law continues to grow in importance, defenses to charges of war crimes are taking on a generic standardization that affects trials in national courts as well as in international tribunals. This paper briefly discusses the most important defenses and some of their theoretical interconnections.
In keeping with the universal character of war crimes, national tribunals from all over the world and the several international tribunals that have been established in recent years have treated each other's decisions as having precedential value. Thus there has been a co-evolution of war-crimes doctrine. Because of this welcome interfertilization, it would be misleading here to attempt to track separately the developments in national and international prosecutions for war crimes. A lawyer defending an accused person before either type of tribunal needs to become familiar with the full range of available defenses and the strategic trade-offs among them.
National tribunals permit certain jurisdictional defenses that do not arise in international prosecutions for war crimes. Hence, after a discussion of the common substantive defenses, this paper will briefly consider the particular jurisdictional defenses that may arise in national tribunals.
I. SUBSTANTIVE DEFENSES
A. Superior Orders
International law, like nearly all systems of domestic law, does not allow a "defense" of superior orders. Yet anyone who was ordered to commit an illegal act will raise such a "defense." If he does so, his plea will be taken as an affirmative response to the indictment. A court typically will accept the plea in partial mitigation of punishment for the crime. Moreover, defense counsel should stress "superior orders" at the pleabargaining stage prior to trial, for even though it is not a legal defense it is a psychological defense that could jeopardize the prosecution's case.
The defendant's plea that he was just following orders is strongest when defendants are common foot soldiers and gets progressively weaker for defendants with higher and higher rank. (Every Nazi official claimed to be following Hitler's orders.) At the three thousand prosecutions in Europe following the Second World War, prosecutorial discretion was exercised so that no one below the rank of sergeant was charged with committing a war crime.
Defense counsel for persons accused of war crimes should raise the plea of superior orders at the trial and not wait until the sentencing stage after trial. This advice seems to contradict the previously mentioned principle that superior orders may only be assessed in mitigation of punishment. For there is always a chance that the Tribunal might hold that that in the heat of battle, an illegal order could have overwhelmed the recipient to the extent of compromising his volition. Since the prosecutor must prove intent (mens rea), it remains a (remote) possibility that a superior's orders in a particularly difficult war context might be taken as disproof of criminal intent.
In the many trials in the Far East following World War II, one may read in the transcripts considerable discussion of the defendants' conduct in obeying the principles of the Empire and the Emperor and of loyalty to the generals in the field without often encountering the phrase "superior orders." What in effect happened was that counsel introduced the concept of superior orders without using the vocabulary, undoubtedly because the tribunals might have ruled such arguments out of order if they came labeled as "superior orders" arguments. This tactic clearly is an important one for the defense in any trial where superior orders could be a factor on the merits of the case.
The plea of superior orders would be far more difficult for a person accused of terrorism, due to the lack of a military command structure. A terrorist seems to be a person acting under his own volition, quite unlike a soldier in the field responding to his commander's orders. The defendant would have to convince the tribunal that he was acting under a mental compulsion, that the "cause" he was fighting for-not himselfwas the "cause" of his act. Such a defense would probably be a waste of time.
B. Command Responsibility
Command responsibility is the other side of the coin of superior orders. An accused person who committed no war crimes himself may nevertheless be held responsible for the acts of his subordinates under international law if (a) he is their military commander, (b) he knew or had reason to know that the crimes were taking place or about to take place, and (c) he was in a position to prevent or mitigate those crimes but failed to do so.
An apparent paradox arises if the concept of command responsibility is coupled with that of superior orders. Resolving this paradox will shed light on both of these concepts. Suppose A, an officer in command, orders B, a soldier, to shoot an innocent civilian. B, following the order, kills the civilian. We have seen above that if B is indicted for committing a war crime, he has no defense of superior orders. He simply should not have obeyed the order because it was an illegal order under international criminal law. Now comes the paradoxical part of the example. If A is indicted for ordering the commission of a war crime, can A defend on the ground that his order was null and void when given and hence A cannot legally be held responsible for B's subsequent illegal act? Moreover, doesn't the fact that B is held 100% responsible for the war crime (because B has no defense of superior orders) mean that 100% of the criminal responsibility has been used up and there is nothing left for indicting A? Yamashita in fact adopted the optimal strategy under the circumstances, which was to address the sailors' unruly behavior indirectly. As soon as he landed on the island, the General instituted a severe spit-and-polish regimen where everyone of his subordinates had to act strictly according to formal military procedure and moreover were charged with seeing that their own subordinates did likewise. This was the only way to bring order and discipline to the Japanese armed forces-from the top on down. The defense team should have argued to the Tribunal-whose judges were themselves experience military officers-that when soldiers are funning amok and committing crimes, there is no way to stop them except by enforcing a policy of strict military discipline. What
Yamashita did was a necessary prerequisite to stopping the war crimes.
Yamashita's conviction, and its affirmance by the United States Supreme Court,
has created a very difficult precedent for persons accused of command responsibility for The Yamashita precedent has also played a major role among the civilian and military leaders of Serbia, Bosnia, and Croatia in the recent three-cornered civil war in former Yugoslavia. 4 All during the war their lawyers advised them to make a "paper record" of their orders, instructions, rulings, and directives that were related to the specific goal of outlawing war crimes, creating tribunals for those persons who committed those crimes, and overseeing their punishment. The commanders were also advised to distance themselves as much as possible from the war crimes that were being committed on the ground. Hence the appearance of "paramilitary forces"-civilians who entered towns in advance of the regular army and looted, tortured, and killed the residents.
These paramilitary forces were said to be acting autonomously and not under the military command of the army. Hence the generals and civilian leaders of the army could provide some evidence, if indicted, that they factually lacked control and hence should not be charged with the specific crime of command responsibility for the commission of war crimes.
Terrorist leaders, who flout all laws and are liable to be shot on sight by the police, will hardly be deterred by the rules of command responsibility. However, as an academic point, it might be worth briefly pointing out that terrorist organizations are so informally structured, if they are structured at all, that a prosecutor might be hard-pressed to prove a leader's command responsibility. However, at a slightly lower level of proof, it would be easy to show that the leader was engaged in a criminal conspiracy and that he aided and abetted the persons in his organization who committed war crimes.
C. Tu Quoque
The claim of tu quoque-that nationals of the prosecuting state are not being prosecuted for similar acts-is a plea in avoidance. It is not strictly speaking a defense to the indictment, and in this sense it is like the plea of superior orders. In response to a plea of tu quoque, the prosecutor will argue that such a fact is extrinsic to the present trial.
"Prosecutorial discretion" may account for the lack of prosecutions in the other cases, but that does not mean that the present indictment should be dismissed. The tribunal will surely agree. was a war crime for a submarine to sink a vessel and then fail to pick up the survivors.
But with the dramatic increase in air power, submarine commanders in the process of rescuing survivors were met with bombardment from the air. At that point it became suicidal for submarine commanders to remain afloat long enough to rescue enemy survivors. After a number of Admiral Dőnitz's U-boats were bombed in the course of rescue operations, he called a halt to the practice. 5 Presumably Admiral Nimitz, on the other side of the world, issued a similar order. Thus the important argument was not that 5 Neither Dőnitz nor his counsel, nor any of the judges at the Tribunal, were aware that the frequency with which Allied planes showed up during submarine rescue missions was not due to luck. Rather, as was revealed years later, the Allies had cracked the German "Enigma" code which enabled Allied radio operators to listen in and decode all German naval messages. Thus the Allies were able to pinpoint the German rescue operations and "luckily" show up at the crucial moment when the U-boats were surfaced.
Nimitz was doing the same thing, but that the combined practice of Dőnitz and Nimitz pointed to a new rule of international customary law (based on the practice of states), namely, that due to new technology the practice of rescuing survivors at sea was no longer a violation of international criminal law.
D. Military Necessity
"Military necessity" as a putative defense to war crimes is so all-encompassing that few courts will take it seriously. After all, military forces try to win wars; they do not typically issue commands that are cost-ineffective. Therefore everything they do is a matter of military necessity. They do not waste ammunition on non-military targets; they do not sink cruisers carrying tourists. To be sure, these observations are negated for terrorist organizations. They deliberately target non-combatants. Nearly everything they do is cost-ineffective from a military standpoint. But their goals are political, not military.
A war-crimes defendant need not prove strict cost-effectiveness. Considerable latitude is given to commanders in the field to judge what appeared to them at the time to have been reasonable and prudent from a military standpoint. They are not required to abstain from an act because of its brutality or its infliction of grave punishment upon the enemy if the act is justifiable from a military perspective and is not per se a war crime.
The bombing of munitions factories is justifiable by military necessity even though many workers and their families will inevitably be killed. Hitler's genocidal campaign as impeding the war effort, refused to help whenever they could, and withheld guns and ammunition to the civilians engaged in effectuating the Holocaust. Thus it would be impossible to claim that the Holocaust was a matter of military necessity. By the same token, it was not even a war crime, as it was external to the war and contrary to its military purpose.
The same cannot be said of General Curtis LeMay's campaign to terrorize the Japanese people by dropping napalm bombs on the northern suburbs of Tokyo which, at the time (March 10, 1945) , was one of the most congested residential areas in the world.
Hundreds of thousands of homes, and all the women, children, and elderly persons in and around them, were reduced to ashes. 
E. Proportionality
Both prosecution and defense will often encounter the doctrine of proportionality.
Perhaps the best way to introduce that doctrine is to contrast it to military necessity.
Consider a hypothetical case of a densely populated residential area containing in its midst a small military target such as an armory of a military light-vehicle facility.
Bombing the area of the armory, although causing great collateral damage to civilians, might be justified under military necessity. But under the doctrine of proportionality, there would be a tighter cost/benefit analysis. The "cost" would be the civilians who 9 Of course, after the war, LeMay was not prosecuted; indeed, he ran for Vice President on the Independent ticket in 1968. 10 The 'psychological" justification of the fire-bombing by LeMay and his superiors seems deranged. How could they expect the Japanese people to surrender unconditionally to a nation that could contemplate and carry out such an unprecedented atrocity? The fire bombing in fact only intensified the will of the Japanese people to resist the Allies at any cost.
would be killed or wounded in the attack. If the "benefit" is slight compared to that cost, The concept of proportionality has a special role to play in determining the legitimacy of war-time reprisals, our next topic.
F. Reprisals
Prior to 1860, reprisals played a large role in the conduct of warfare. A reprisal is an act that is illegal in itself, but becomes legal when taken in retaliation (under some constraints to be discussed below) against an illegal act by the other side. after the Second World War, 13 Occupied Dutch citizens had engaged in acts of violence against German soldiers. German reprisals were then taken against Dutch citizens at random. The tribunal recognized that the occupying power had a right to answer violent resistance by retributive action, but found that Rautner's reprisals were taken for purposes of revenge and not as a deterrent. The conclusion was based on the fact that Rautner made no attempt to arrest the actual perpetrators of the resistance actions but rather killed hostages at random.
G. Other Defenses
The defenses that have been covered in this Chapter are those that may generally be asserted under international law when a person is accused in a national court of violating international law. They stem not from the laws of the forum state, but rather from the same source that the forum state invokes in its indictment-namely, international criminal law.
However, defense counsel must take into account other defenses that arise under the particular laws of the forum state. The above enumeration and discussion of generally available defenses under international law should not be construed as preempting or replacing or otherwise averting recourse to defenses available in any criminal action under the laws of the forum state.
In addition, defenses available under the general principles of criminal law are of course available in war-crimes prosecutions such as self-defense, juvenile status at the time of the act, mental disability or incompetence, or physical coercion. 
II. JURISDICTIONAL DEFENSES IN NATIONAL COURTS
B. Jurisdiction Over the Subject Matter
A person accused of war crimes or crimes against humanity committed abroad might claim that he did not violate the law of the forum state and hence the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over him. Such a claim will probably fail for any of three reasons. First, there is the above-mentioned rule of universal jurisdiction which a court might invoke as the controlling test of subject-matter jurisdiction. 16 Second, the forum state may have incorporated in its Constitution the international rules prohibiting war crimes and crimes against humanity. 17 Third, the forum state may have statutes that parallel in wording the international rules prohibiting war crimes and crimes against humanity.
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If the only legal basis for a nation's prosecution is "universal jurisdiction," a defendant will surely try to argue the general prohibition against ex post facto criminality-that he cannot be prosecuted for an act which was not a crime within the court's jurisdiction when he committed it. The idea of ex post facto or retroactive criminality is generally expressed in international criminal law as the prohibition of nullen crimen sine lege-the conduct must be a crime at the time it takes place. However, it is expressed, the argument has more emotional force if the crime itself is a new one, as was arguably the case for "crimes against humanity," the fourth count alleged at the Nuremberg Tribunal following the Second World War. Of the twenty-two major Nazi war criminals tried at Nuremberg, two (Streicher and von Schirach) were convicted solely on the basis of the fourth count, and although their crimes arguably could be subsumed under an aggravated war crimes charge, 19 the ex post facto argument was rejected by the tribunal. There were sixteen convictions under the fourth count in total, and the general response of international publicists since 1947 has been to accept the appropriateness of the "crimes against humanity" or "genocide" category. 20 Perhaps the most substantial basis for that acceptance is the theory that genocide was always clearly criminal in fact, and when international law finally recognized it as a crime at Nuremberg in name and in theory, that recognition was not ex post facto. The defendants at Nuremberg could hardly claim that they did not know what they did was wrong; rather they could only claim that they did not know a court would punish them for it. Thus, even if we concede that in this regard the defendants were taken by surprise, their surprise was that they were being punished and not whether they deserved being punished.
Nevertheless there is always a possibility that a newly defined crime might unfairly be applied in a case where a defendant had no reason to know that it would be deemed a crime. One should not dismiss all ex post facto objections as frivolous, because a case could arise where it is indeed a meaningful defense. In such a case, the defendant ought to argue that the same international law that defines the crime contains within it the principle of justice prohibiting the truly retroactive application of criminal laws, and that such a principle of the just law of nations should operate to bar the assertion of subjectmatter jurisdiction.
C. New Problems of Double Jeopardy
Uncharted waters lie ahead in international criminal law if a defendant pleads that he has already been tried for war crimes or crimes against humanity and hence cannot be tried again for the same crimes. However, there is no rule of international customary law prohibiting double jeopardy.
What if a defendant is acquitted in T-1 (the first trial) and then is convicted in T-2 which takes place in another country? What if he is convicted in both T-1 and T-2, but the sentence in T-2 is more harsh? What if trial T-1 takes place in absentia whereas the defendant is present in T-2? What if a defendant is convicted in T-1 while personally present, and then acquitted in T-2 in absentia? What if T-1 or T-2 is an international tribunal and the other a national tribunal-will the international tribunal's decision control the result irrespective of whether it is the first court or the second court to try the defendant?
Although customary international law will not help the defendant in doublejeopardy prosecutions, there may be room for the defendant to argue that double jeopardy is barred by "general principles of international law." These general principles are not the same as custom; they are a tertiary source of international law after custom and treaties. This relative lack of doctrinal change is beneficial in light of the purpose of the international law of war crimes, which is to deter those crimes. The clearer and more stable the doctrine, the higher its deterrent value.
